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Paciente Vs Dacuycuy G R L 58319

No. L-58319; June 29, 1982
First Division; Gutierrez:

FACTS: Leonardo Homeres died in 1972 leaving his wife, Lilia Samson Homeres and his two minor children, Shirley and Leandro, a parcel of land known as Lot No. 3085-G. On September 9, 1976, Lilia sold the said lot to Conchita Dumdum for Php10,000. On November 11, 1976, Lilia filed a petition for guardianship over the persons and estate of the minors which was granted by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Leyte (herein respondent and hereinafter referred to as â€œcourtâ€).

On September 21, 1977, Conchita Dumdum sold the same lot (which was already under her name) to Patria Paciente (herein petitioner) for Php15,000. The latter mortgaged the lot (which is already under her name) with the Consolidated Bank and Trust Company (hereinafter referred to as CBTC) for Php30,000.

On September 12, 1980, the Acting City Register of Deeds of Tacloban City filed with the said court a manifestation informing respondent court of the abovementioned facts which involve a lot which is under guardianship proceedings. Due to this, the court issued an order directing the petitioner and the manager of CBTC to appear before it and show cause why the title of the said lot co-owned by the minors Shirley and Leandro should not be cancelled for having been alienated without its authority. The two did not appear. Instead, it was Conchita Dumdum who appeared and explained to the court that she sold the lot without the approval of the court because she was not aware of such requirement regarding the properties of the minors. On the same day, the court issued another order requiring the petitioner and the manager of CBTC to explain why the title should not be cancelled for their failure to first secure judicial authority before disposing the property. During the hearing, George Go, petitionerâ€™s husband told the court that the petitioner was an innocent purchaser for value of the lot in question. The court issued an order directing the petitioner and Conchita Dumdum to give and deposit with the clerk of court the amount of Php10,000 more as additional consideration of the subject lot which the court believes to be the fair and reasonable price of the property. If the said amount will not be deposited on or before June 24, 1981, the title shall be cancelled. Their motion for reconsideration was denied by the court and it likewise ordered that the Register of Deeds shall cancel the title of the petitioner and shall issue a new title in favor of the two children.

The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition contending that the court in hearing a petition for guardianship is not the proper situs for the cancellation of a Torrens Title.

ISSUES

1. Was it proper for the court to order the delivery or return of the subject lot?

2. Was it proper for the court to order the delivery of an additional Php10,000?

RULING

1. Yes, it was proper. It is under the jurisdiction of the guardianship to order the delivery or return of the property in question because the right or title of the minors is clear and indisputable (Section 6, Rule 88 and Section 6, Rule 97 of the Rules of Court). Since the property was sold without the approval of the court it is right to order such delivery or return.

2. No, it was not proper. The order was issued without a hearing and the time frame for fixing said amount is not clear. Hence, it is null and void.

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Bandoy V Ca 175 Scra 459

SPOUSES MARCIANO BANDOY and SEGUNDINA BANDOY, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and DOMINGO P. EMPAYNADO respondents.

G.R. No. 77133 July 19, 1989

MEDIALDEA, J.:

Facts: Spouses Marciano and Segundina Bandoy herein petitioners, were lessees of a residential house and lot owned by the University of the Philippines. Sometime in April 1984, petitioners sublet certain spaces of the property to Eduardo Empaynado, herein private respondent, for a monthly rental of P550. Empaynado failed to pay the rental for the month of July, 1985. Upon demand by petitioners to pay, Empaynado still failed and refused to pay.

Thereafter, petitioners brought the matter to the office of the barangay captain for settlement, but to no avail. However, a certification to file action against Domingo Empaynado for ejectment and non-payment of house rentals including light and water was issued by the office of the barangay captain.

On November 26,1985, petitioners filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Empaynado and attached thereto the certification to file action issued by the barangay captain. The case was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro Manila. In his answer, Empaynado admitted that he did not pay the rentals but denied that there was a demand to vacate and pay made upon him by spouses Marciano and Segundina Bandoy in their complaint.

After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the spouses. The court is of the view that a demand to vacate before the barangay court is a substantial equivalent of the required extrajudicial demand to pay and vacate required by the Rules of Court prior to the filing of an ejectment case in court. Empaynado was orderd to vacate and pay all unpaid rentals.

Empaynado appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court which rendered a decision dismissing the case for ejectment for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.

Spouses Marciano and Segundina Bandoy filed a petition for review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the case also for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.

Petitioners then came before the Supreme Court through a petition by certiorari of Court of Appealsâ€™ decision contending that no further demand to vacate was made by petitioners after the certification to file was issued by the Barangay captain for the reason that the case was already certified for court action. Under this situation, any further demand to vacate was merely repetitive and unnecessary.

Issue: Whether or not herein petitionersâ€™ contention is impressed with merit to confer Municipal Trial Court jurisdiction.

Ruling: It is not disputed that the complaint contains no allegation that there was a prior demand to vacate made by the petitioners upon private respondent. It is a settled rule that â€œwhere the complaint contains no allegation that a demand had been made upon the defendant to vacate the premises but only an allegation that a demand was made for payment of the rentals agreed upon, it is held that such allegation is insufficient to confer jurisdiction upon a justice of the peace court. The certification issued by the office of the barangay captain is not conclusive as to the jurisdiction of the court to which the case was subsequently filed. What was certified by the barangay captain was that no settlement was reached by the parties in the barangay level. It did not certify that all the requisites for the filing of an unlawful detainer case had been complied with.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals is affirmed.

In the Co Tiamco case, it was proven that there was indeed a notice to quit or demand to vacate served upon the defendants. The notice to vacate was offered and admitted in evidence. In the case at bar, the complaint was defective because of its failure to allege that there was a prior demand to vacate. The defect was not cured because no evidence of a prior demand to vacate was presented in the trial court. The affidavit of Empaynado relied upon by the trial judge to the effect that: â€œna ako ang tinutukoy ni Marciano Tamis Bandoy dahil di umanoâ€™y sa di magandang asal namin na gusto niyang paalisinsa kanyang extensionâ€, does not prove that the spouses demanded that he vacate the premises. What Empaynado admitted in the said affidavit was that the spouses intended to expel him out of the premises (â€œgusto niyang paalisinâ€™) but has not actually or definitely demanded that he vacate the premises. An intention to oust is different from an actually or definitely demanded to vacate. It is the latter which confers jurisdiction upon the municipal court.

Movido Vs Rehabilitation Finance Corp Rfc 105 Phil 886

FACTS: Vet Bros. and Company (Vet) executed a chattel mortgage in favor of Movido over its interests and some machineries in a sawmill it owned to secure the payment of its loan (P15,000.00) from the latter. Two years after, Movido brought an action against Vet before CFI to recover the amount with interest. The parties entered into a compromise agreement which was approved and CFI rendered judgment in accordance thereof.

Thereafter, Vet morgated the same property to secure its loan from RFC. Four years after, RFC sought for the foreclosure of the morgaged property. Movido (not yet paid) filed a third party claim contending that his chattel morgage was executed and recorded first. The Sheriff proceeded with the foreclosure and the property were sold.

Movido filed an action against RFC and the Sheriff for unlawfully disregarding his third party claim. CFI ruled against Movido saying that Movido waived his right to foreclose the morgaged property upon filing of the complaint against Vet and therefore his lien over the property no longer exist.

Motion for New Trial and MR were denied. He appealed to CA which certified the case to SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not Movido lost his right to foreclose the mortgaged property

RULING: Yes. The CFI was correct. A mortgagee who sues and obtained a judgment against the mortgagor upon his credit waives his right to foreclose the mortgage securing it. Reason: Splitting of cause of action.

Williams And Rian Vs Icao

Williams and Rian vs. Icao

A.C. No. 6882, December 24, 2008

Facts: Atty. Rodrigo Icao notarized a Declaration of Heirship and Partition, making it appear that three of its signatories signed it in his presence when in truth they did not. Atty. Icao admitted that the document was not executed in his presence, but claimed that before he notarized it, the parties thereto appeared before him and he ascertained their identities as well as of those of their witnesses. The IBP Board of Governors dismissed the complaint, so the complainants filed a motion for reconsideration, which was forwarded by the IBP to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Icao, by notarizing the said document, failed to discharge his duty to inform himself of the facts to which he intended to certify.

Ruling: Affirmative. The document does not bear the residence certificate number of Lucia Briones, one of the signatories. In notarizing it without recording Luciaâ€™s residence certificate, Atty. Icao violated the Notarial Law then effective, which required the notary public to certify that a party to the instrument which was acknowledged before him had presented the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence certificate) and to enter its number, place and date of issue as part of the certification. By Atty. Icaoâ€™s own admission, the signatories to the document did not personally sign it in his presence. He, however, claims that they appeared before him and confirmed their identities and acknowledged that the signatures appearing thereon were theirs. If indeed the heirs-signatories and their witnesses had personally appeared before respondent, it is beyond comprehension why he did not ask them to affix their signatures in his presence. By such omission, he failed to heed his duty as a notary public to demand that the document for notarization be signed in his presence.

Disposition: Atty. Rodrigo Icao was suspended from the practice of law and from his commission as a notary public for a period of one year with warning that a commission of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Sarmiento Vs Comelec

Facts: This special civil action for certiorari seek to set aside the Resolutions of Respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in the following Special Cases:

1) G.R. No. 105628 – SPC No. 92-266
2) G.R. No. 105725 – SPC No. 92-323
3) G.R. No. 105727 – SPC No. 92-288
4) G.R. No. 105730 – SPC No. 92-315
5) G.R. No. 105771 – SPC No. 92-271
6) G.R. No. 105778 – SPC No. 92-039
7) G.R. No. 105797 – SPC No. 92-153
8) G.R. No. 105919 – SPC No. 92-293
9) G.R. No. 105977 – SPC No. 92-087

Issue: Whether the challenged Resolutions above specified (the SPC) as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion in that, inter alia, the Commission, sitting en banc, took cognizance of and decided the appeals without first referring them to any of it Divisions.

Held: The COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, when it resolved the appeals of petitioners in the above mentioned Special Cases without first referring them to any of its Divisions. Section 3, subdivision C, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides:

Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.
Said Resolutions are therefore, null and void and must be set aside. Consequently, the appeals are deemed pending before the Commission for proper referral to a Division.

A resolution directing the COMELEC to assign said Special Cases to the Divisions pursuant to Section 8, Rule 3 of its Rules on assignment of cases would, logically, be in order. However, Section 16 of R.A. No. 7166 6 provides that all pre-proclamation cases pending before it shall be deemed terminated at the beginning of the term of the office involved. The terms of the offices involved in the Special Cases subject of these petitions commenced at noon of June 30 1992. These cases have thus been rendered moot and such a resolution would only be an exercise in futility.

Therefore, the instant petitions are DISMISSED but without prejudice to the filing by petitioners of regular elections protests. If the winning candidates for the positions involved in the Special Cases subject of these petitions have already been proclaimed, the running of the period to file the protests shall be deemed suspended by the pendency of such cases before the COMELEC and of these petitions before this Court.

Notes:

1) G.R. No. 105628 – SPC No. 92-266 granting the appeal from the ruling of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Virac, Catanduanes which ordered the exclusion from the canvass of one (1) election return;
2) G.R. No. 105725 – SPC No. 92-323 reversing the ruling of the City Board of Canvassers of Iriga City which ordered the exclusion from the canvass of six (6) election returns and in UND No. 92-243 ordering the said Board of Canvassers to include in the canvass the election returns involved therein;
3) G.R. No. 105727 – SPC No. 92-288 dismissing the appeal of petitioner from the ruling of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Catanduanes which ordered the inclusion in the canvass the certificate of canvass for the municipality of Virac, excluding the returns from 48 precincts;
4) G.R. No. 105730 – SPC No. 92-315 affirming the ruling of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte which dismissed petitionerâ€™s opposition to the composition of the said Municipal Board of Canvassers;
5) G.R. No. 105771 – SPC No. 92-271 affirming the ruling of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Cabusao, Camarines Sur which, among others, rejected petitionerâ€™s objection to certain election returns;
6) G.R. No. 105778 – SPC No. 92-039 dismissing said case for non-compliance with Section 20 of R.A. No. 7166;
7) G.R. No. 105797 – SPC No. 92-153 affirming the rulings of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Davao Oriental which rejected petitionerâ€™s objections to the canvass of some certificates of canvass;
8) G.R. No. 105919 – SPC No. 92-293 dismissing petitionerâ€™s appeal from the ruling of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Upi Nuro, Maguindanao;
9) G.R. No. 105977 – SPC No. 92-087 denying the amended pre-proclamation petition, which is an appeal from the rulings of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Ternate, Cavite, and denying a subsequent motion to resolve the issues raised in said amended petition.

Nolasco V Comelec

Nolasco v. COMELEC

FACTS: A disqualification case was filed against Meycauayan, Bulacan Mayor-elect Florentino Blanco for alleged performing acts which are grounds for disqualification under the Omnibus Election Code â€“ giving money to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing election functions: for committing acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy, and for spending an amount for his campaign in excess of what is allowed by the law. The COMELEC First Division required both parties to submit their position papers. The case was decided against Blanco. A reconsideration was moved by Blanco in the COMELEC En Banc. Nolasco, the vice-mayor-elect took part as intervenor, urging that should Blanco be finally disqualified, the mayoralty position be turned over to him. The parties were allowed to file their memoranda. En Banc denied Blanco and Nolascoâ€™s motions thus this petition for certiorari.

Issues:
1. WON Blanco was denied due process and equal protection of laws
2. WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in proclaiming Alarilla as the duly elected mayor

Held:
1. Blanco was not denied due process and equal protection of the laws. He was given all the opportunity to prove that the evidence on his disqualification was not strong. Blancoâ€™s contention that the minimum quantum of evidence was not met is untenable. What RA 6646 and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure require is a mere evidence of guilt that should be strong to justify the COMELEC in suspending a winning candidateâ€™s proclamation.

2. Nolasco, not Alarilla, is adjudged as the Mayor of Meycauayan. It is already a settled principle in the case of Reyes v. COMELEC that the candidate with the second highest number of votes cannot be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate be disqualified. There cannot be an assumption that the second placer would have received the other votes otherwise it is a judgment substituting the mind of a voter. It cannot be assumed that the second placer would have won the elections because in the situation where the disqualified candidate is excluded, the condition would have substantially changed.

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